The short answer
Your insurance application is a free security checklist. Check you can prove every Yes.
A cyber insurance application asks about specific security controls, and the people who write it pay the claims when the answers turn out wrong. Most firms are about as secure as they think but can't prove it, and an insurer can't price what it can't see. So pull out your last renewal application and check you could show evidence for every Yes. Where a question assumes an office network you don't have, answer No and attach a short note on what you do instead.
We applied for our own cyber and technology errors-and-omissions insurance this month. The application had ninety questions, most of them about specific security controls. It also had a whole supplemental questionnaire about nothing but multi-factor authentication (MFA), the second sign-in check after a password. It's the most useful security document we've read in a year, and it's free.
Every framework you've been handed comes from someone selling you something: a vendor's checklist leads to the vendor's product, and a consultant's assessment to the consultant's paid engagement. An insurance application is different, because the people who write it pay the claims when the answers turn out to be wrong. They've refined it over years of watching which controls actually correlate with losses, and nobody on the other end of that form is trying to sell you software. If you haven't filled one out, or you signed the last renewal without reading it, here's what it asks and what it means for your firm.
The eight questions that hold up an application
Most of the ninety questions are background. A smaller set decides whether your application goes forward, and here they are, roughly in order of how often they hold one up:
Multi-factor authentication on email. The usual gap is that MFA is on for most staff, but older sign-in methods (legacy authentication) are still open somewhere. Those quietly get around MFA.
MFA on remote and administrative access. This is the one that matters most. Firms require MFA for ordinary staff but exempt the administrators and the service accounts (accounts that software signs in with instead of a person). That's exactly backwards. An attacker who breaks into an ordinary account is a problem, but one who reaches an administrator account without MFA controls your firm's entire cloud setup.
MFA on backup systems. It's almost never set up, and usually nobody has thought about it. Backups are your way back, and ransomware attackers destroy them before they encrypt anything. Yet those backups are often protected by a password alone.
Conditional access policies. These are sign-in rules the firm sets in one central place, such as which devices and locations staff can sign in from. Without them, Microsoft's sign-in service offers two other ways to require MFA. Security defaults make everyone register for MFA and leave Microsoft to decide when to ask for it, with no rules of the firm's own. Per-user MFA is switched on by an administrator one account at a time, so an account that gets missed has none.
Endpoint detection with central visibility. This means security software on every computer, all reporting to one place. Antivirus installed on each machine isn't the same as knowing how many machines you have, and the common failure is three laptops nobody knew were unmanaged.
Backups that have been restore-tested. Nearly every firm has backups, but very few have tested a restore. Until a backup has been restored, nobody knows whether it works.
A written incident response plan. This is the plan for what the firm does when something goes wrong. Either it's missing, or it names a coordinator who left the firm two years ago.
Privileged access. This is about who holds administrator rights. At some point everyone senior was made a global administrator, the top admin role, and nobody ever took it away.
Carriers (the insurers) are also beginning to ask about generative AI use, prompt logging (a record of what staff type into AI tools) and acceptable use policies. Consumer AI tools the firm doesn't manage are a strong candidate for the next auto-decline trigger, an answer that gets an application turned down on its own. Most firms can't currently answer these questions at all.
Questions that don't fit a cloud-only firm
Insurance applications were written for a 2012 office, with servers in a closet and a firewall around the office network. The person working from home on a Tuesday came in over a VPN, a private tunnel into that network. If your firm runs entirely in the cloud, several questions have no honest good answer.
Do you restrict remote access to a VPN? No, because there's no office network to tunnel into. Every system is a cloud service reached over an encrypted connection.
Do you require dual authorization for all wire transfers? No, because there are four people in the firm and two of them are the partners.
Do you require background checks on all employees? That question assumes you have an HR department.
Answered honestly, these questions make your application read like a firm with no controls. But a dishonest answer is a false statement on a document that carries fraud language, and that can void the policy at the moment you need it.
The third option is a compensating control, a different safeguard that gives the same protection the question was written to test for. You answer No and attach a short written explanation of what you do instead.
For the VPN question, the explanation says there's no on-premises network, meaning no network in an office. All systems are cloud services reached over TLS, the standard encrypted connection. Multi-factor authentication is enforced at the identity provider, the service your staff use to sign in. Conditional access policies limit where, and from which devices, staff can sign in. That tells the underwriter what protects remote access in place of a VPN.
For dual authorization, the explanation says any change to payment instructions is checked by a separate telephone call to a number already on file. It's never checked by calling a number given in the request.
A No with that written explanation attached reads completely differently from a No alone. The explanation is called an addendum, and it takes about an hour to write. It's the best-spent hour in the entire application process.
What we found when we answered it ourselves
We're a security firm, and we had every framework, template and checklist on hand. Answering the ninety questions still turned up two gaps in our own setup.
There was no written offboarding procedure, the steps for shutting off a departing person's access. Nobody had ever left the firm, and that isn't a control; it only means the need had never come up. There were backups too, in the sense that the vendors whose platforms we use keep backups, but nobody had ever tried a restore.
Neither of those was a technical failure. The tools were running the entire time, but nothing written down proved they were, so both were failures of evidence. An underwriter can't price a control they can't see, and neither can an examiner.
That's the gap this exercise exposes, and it's almost always the real one. Firms are rarely as insecure as their applications make them look. They're usually about as secure as they think, but they're completely unable to prove it.
Both gaps are closed now, and closing them took an afternoon. We only found them because someone with money at stake asked a specific question in writing.
Three numbers firms mix up
These three come up constantly, and mixing them up leads firms to the wrong conclusion about what they owe. If you're wondering whether the Safeguards Rule applies to an accounting practice at all, 16 CFR 314.2 gives examples of a financial institution. Among them it names an accountant or other tax preparation service that is in the business of completing income tax returns.
500 consumers is the notification trigger. Under 16 CFR 314.4(j), if a notification event involves the information of at least 500 consumers, the firm must report it to the Federal Trade Commission. The deadline is as soon as possible, and no later than 30 days after discovery.
5,000 consumers is the exemption ceiling. Under 16 CFR 314.6, financial institutions that maintain customer information on fewer than five thousand consumers are exempt from four specific requirements. Two are the written risk assessment at 314.4(b)(1) and the continuous monitoring or penetration testing requirement at (d)(2). The other two are the written incident response plan at (h) and the annual written report to leadership at (i).
500,000 records is one of the size bands on the insurance application, where it asks how much data you hold. It has nothing to do with either of the other two.
A firm can fall below the 5,000 exemption ceiling and still owe the FTC a notification, because the two numbers measure different things. An insurer doesn't care about either one, though. Being exempt from a rule isn't the same as being insurable, and the underwriter will want the control regardless of what the rule lets you skip.
Most firms that assume they're under the 5,000 figure have never actually counted. The count is consumers whose information you maintain, not clients you billed this year. Prior-year returns still on file count. 16 CFR 314.2(b)(1) defines a consumer as an individual who obtains or has obtained a financial product or service from you, mainly for personal, family or household use. It doesn't say whether a spouse or dependent on a joint return counts as a consumer in their own right. A cautious firm near the line counts them, and your counsel can tell you whether you have to.
What to do next
Start with the checklist you already have. Pull out your last renewal application and go through it one question at a time. For every Yes you gave, check whether you could produce evidence and show it to someone, however true the answer felt when you signed it.
That exercise costs nothing and takes an afternoon, and it'll tell you more about how secure your firm actually is than most checklists you could buy. Where you find a Yes you can't back up with evidence, you've found real work. And where a No deserves an explanation, an hour spent on the addendum will change how your application reads.
Related questions
What does a cyber insurance application actually ask about?+
Specific security controls. The application we completed had ninety questions, most of them about controls, and a supplemental questionnaire about multi-factor authentication alone. The people who write the form pay claims when the answers turn out to be wrong, and they've refined it over years of watching which controls correlate with losses. So it isn't built around any vendor's product.
Which answers most often stall a submission?+
Eight. Three of them are multi-factor authentication: on email, on remote and administrative access, and on backup systems. Then come conditional access policies, endpoint detection with central visibility, backups that have been restore-tested and a written incident response plan. The last is privileged access held only by people whose job is administration. Remote and administrative access is the one firms most often get backwards, because they require MFA for ordinary staff but exempt the administrators and service accounts.
How does a cloud-only firm answer questions written for an office network?+
With a compensating control. Answer No and attach a short written explanation of the different safeguard that gives the same protection. For the VPN question, the explanation says there's no on-premises network and all systems are cloud services reached over TLS. Multi-factor authentication is enforced at the identity provider, and conditional access policies limit where, and from which devices, staff can sign in. A No with an addendum reads completely differently from a No alone, and the addendum takes about an hour to write.
What is the difference between 500, 5,000 and 500,000?+
500 consumers is the notification trigger. Under 16 CFR 314.4(j), a notification event involving at least 500 consumers must be reported to the Federal Trade Commission. The deadline is as soon as possible and no later than 30 days after discovery. Under 16 CFR 314.6, 5,000 consumers is the exemption ceiling. Below it, a firm is relieved of four requirements. Two are the written risk assessment at 314.4(b)(1) and the continuous monitoring or penetration testing requirement at (d)(2). The other two are the written incident response plan at (h) and the annual written report to leadership at (i). 500,000 records is a size band on an insurance application, for how much data you hold. It relates to neither.
Who counts toward the 5,000 figure?+
Consumers whose information the firm maintains, not clients it billed this year. Prior-year returns still on file count. The rule doesn't say whether a spouse or dependent on a joint return counts as a consumer in their own right. A cautious firm near the line counts them and asks its counsel. Most firms that assume they're under the ceiling have never actually counted.
Are carriers asking about AI yet?+
They're beginning to, and questions on generative AI use, prompt logging and acceptable use policies are starting to appear on applications. Consumer AI tools the firm doesn't manage are a strong candidate for the next auto-decline trigger, an answer that gets an application turned down on its own. Most firms can't currently answer these questions at all.
Claremont Security helps regulated firms get more done with AI on client work, with the setup and the record to show for it, whichever tool the firm uses. Our WISP Health Check is free and requires no account: claremontsecurity.com/wisp-check
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